US Amicus Brief (PDF)

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No. 12-35926
IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
___________________________
MARK WANDERING MEDICINE, et al.,
Plaintiffs-Appellants
v.
LINDA McCULLOCH, et al.,
Defendants-Appellees
___________________________
ON APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF MONTANA
___________________________
BRIEF FOR THE UNITED STATES AS AMICUS CURIAE SUPPORTING
PLAINTIFFS-APPELLANTS
___________________________
THOMAS E. PEREZ
Assistant Attorney General
JESSICA DUNSAY SILVER
ANGELA M. MILLER
Attorneys
Department of Justice
Civil Rights Division
Appellate Section
Ben Franklin Station
P.O. Box 14403
Washington, DC 20044-4403
(202) 514-4541

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TABLE OF CONTENTS
PAGE
INTEREST OF THE UNITED STATES .................................................................. 1
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUE ................................................................................. 2
STATEMENT OF FACTS ........................................................................................ 2
1.

Statutory Background ............................................................................ 2

2.

Factual Background .............................................................................. 7

3.

District Court Proceedings ................................................................... 9

ARGUMENT
THE DISTRICT COURT ERRED AS A MATTER OF LAW
IN EVALUATING PLAINTIFFS’ SECTION 2 VOTE DENIAL
CLAIM........................................................................................................... 14
A.

B.

Plaintiffs Alleging Vote Denial Claims Need Not Establish
An Inability To Elect Candidates Of Choice ....................................... 14
1.

The District Court’s Reasoning Ignores The Qualitative
Differences Between “Vote Dilution” And “Vote Denial”
Claims ....................................................................................... 14

2.

The District Court’s Reasoning Conflicts
With Section 2’s Natural And Logical Meaning ....................... 20

District Courts Evaluating Vote Denial Claims
Must Consider Those Circumstances And Facts
Relevant To The Type Of Claim Brought ............................................ 25

CONCLUSION ........................................................................................................ 30
CERTIFICATE OF COMPLIANCE
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

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TABLE OF AUTHORITIES
CASES:

PAGE

Arakaki v. Hawaii, 314 F.3d 1091 (9th Cir. 2002) .................................................... 4
Brown v. Dean, 555 F. Supp. 502 (D.R.I. 1982) ....................................................... 4
Brown v. Post, 279 F. Supp. 60 (W.D. La. 1968)...................................................... 4
Burton v. City of Belle Glade, 178 F.3d 1175 (11th Cir. 1999) ................................ 4
Chisom v. Roemer, 501 U.S. 380 (1991) .......................................................6, 21, 23
City of Mobile v. Bolden, 446 U.S. 55 (1980) ..................................................... 5, 20
Farrakhan v. Gregoire, 590 F.3d 989 (9th Cir.),
rev’d on other grounds, 623 F.3d 990 (9th Cir. 2010) (en banc) ...........passim
Gomez v. City of Watsonville, 863 F.2d 1407 (9th Cir. 1988),
cert. denied, 489 U.S. 1080 (1989) ................................................................ 18
Gonzalez v. Arizona, 677 F.3d 382 (9th Cir.), cert. granted,
sub nom. Arizona v. The Inter Tribal Council of Arizona, Inc.,
133 S. Ct. 476 (2012) (No. 12-71)..........................................................passim
Harris v. Siegelman, 695 F. Supp. 517 (M.D. Ala. 1988)....................................... 23
Jacksonville Coal. for Voter Prot. v. Hood,
351 F. Supp. 2d 1326 (M.D. Fla. 2004) .......................................................... 4
Mississippi State Chapter Operation Push, Inc. v. Allain,
674 F. Supp. 1245 (N.D. Miss. 1987),
aff’d, 932 F.2d 400 (5th Cir. 1991) ................................................................. 4

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CASES (continued):

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PAGE

Perkins v. Matthews, 400 U.S. 379 (1971) .............................................................. 15
Smith v. Salt River Project Agr. Imp. & Power Dist.,
109 F.3d 586 (9th Cir. 1997) ................................................................... 25-26
Spirit Lake Tribe v. Benson Cnty.,
No. 2:10-cv-095, 2010 WL 4226614 (D.N.D. Oct. 21, 2010) ........................ 4
Thornburg v. Gingles, 478 U.S. 30 (1986) ............................................ 15, 22, 24-25
Zimmer v. McKeithen, 485 F.2d 1297 (5th Cir. 1973) (en banc),
aff’d, sub nom. East Carroll Parish Sch. Bd. v. Marshall,
424 U.S. 636 (1976)......................................................................................... 5
STATUTES:
Voting Rights Act (Section 2),
42 U.S.C. 1973............................................................................................. 1-2
42 U.S.C. 1973(a) ......................................................................................2, 25
42 U.S.C. 1973(b) ...................................................................................passim
42 U.S.C. 1973l(c) ........................................................................................... 3
42 U.S.C. 1973j(d) ........................................................................................... 2
Pub. L. No. 89-110, § 2, 79 Stat. 437 (1965) ............................................................. 5
Mont. Code Ann. § 13-2-304 (2012) ......................................................................... 8
Mont. Code Ann. § 13-13-205 (2012) ....................................................................... 8
Mont. Code Ann. § 13-13-211 (2012) ....................................................................... 8
Mont. Code Ann. § 13-13-222 (2012) ....................................................................... 8
LEGISLATIVE HISTORY:
S. Rep. No. 417, 97th Cong., 2d Sess. (1982) ..................................................passim

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IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
_______________________
No. 12-35926
MARK WANDERING MEDICINE, et al.,
Plaintiffs-Appellants
v.
LINDA McCULLOCH, et al.,
Defendants-Appellees
________________________
ON APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF MONTANA
________________________
BRIEF FOR THE UNITED STATES AS AMICUS CURIAE SUPPORTING
PLAINTIFFS-APPELLANTS
_________________________
INTEREST OF THE UNITED STATES
The United States has a direct interest in this appeal, which concerns the
proper interpretation and application of Section 2 of the Voting Rights Act (VRA),
42 U.S.C. 1973. Specifically, this appeal concerns whether a plaintiff alleging a
vote denial or abridgement claim under the VRA based upon unequal access to
voting opportunities must establish that a state voting practice results in the
affected group being unable to elect candidates of its choice. The Department of

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-2Justice is charged with enforcing the VRA, 42 U.S.C. 1973j(d), and therefore has a
strong interest in how courts construe and apply the statute.
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUE
The United States will address the following issue:
Whether a claim of unequal access to voting opportunities under Section 2
of the Voting Rights Act (VRA), 42 U.S.C. 1973, always requires proof of
plaintiffs’ inability to elect candidates of their choice.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
1.

Statutory Background
Section 2 of the Voting Rights Act prohibits voting procedures that deny or

abridge the right to vote on account of race. 42 U.S.C. 1973. Paragraph (a) states,
in pertinent part, that
[n]o voting qualification or prerequisite to voting or standard,
practice, or procedure shall be imposed or applied by any State or
political subdivision in a manner which results in a denial or
abridgement of the right of any citizen of the United States to vote on
account of race or color.
42 U.S.C. 1973(a). Under Paragraph (b), a plaintiff may establish a violation of
this provision if,
based on the totality of the circumstances, it is shown that the political
processes leading to nomination or election in the State or political
subdivision are not equally open to participation by members of a
class of citizens protected by subsection (a) of this section in that its
members have less opportunity than other members of the electorate

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-3to participate in the political process and to elect representatives of
their choice.
42 U.S.C. 1973(b). Paragraph (b) goes on to state that “[t]he extent to which
members of a protected class have been elected to office in the State or political
subdivision is one circumstance which may be considered,” but specifically states
that its protections do not create “a right to have members of a protected class
elected in numbers equal to their proportion in the population.” 42 U.S.C. 1973(b).
Claims brought under Section 2 are generally categorized as either “vote
denial” or “vote dilution” claims, although Section 2’s text makes no distinction
between such claims. “Vote denial” includes claims alleging unequal access to
voting opportunities, and often refers to practices or procedures that interfere with
or impair the ability of would-be voters to register and cast a vote or have that vote
counted.1 Farrakhan v. Gregoire, 590 F.3d 989, 998 n.13 (9th Cir.) (Farrakhan
II), rev’d on other grounds, 623 F.3d 990 (9th Cir. 2010) (en banc) (Farrakhan
III); see also 42 U.S.C. 1973l(c). Historically, these types of claims challenged
practices such as literacy tests, poll taxes, white primaries, and English-only
ballots. Ibid. More recent claims have challenged a group’s unequal access to

1

For purposes of this brief, the United States will use the term “vote denial”
to refer collectively to all claims which could result from either the outright denial
of the right to vote, or merely its abridgement. Under this use, the term “vote
denial” includes the type of claim brought by plaintiffs in this case.

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-4voting practices and procedures, such as exclusionary candidate qualifications,
Arakaki v. Hawaii, 314 F.3d 1091, 1096 (9th Cir. 2002), unequal access to voterregistration opportunities, see Mississippi State Chapter Operation Push, Inc. v.
Allain, 674 F. Supp. 1245 (N.D. Miss. 1987), aff’d, 932 F.2d 400 (5th Cir. 1991),
and unequal access to polling places, see Spirit Lake Tribe v. Benson County, No.
2:10-cv-095, 2010 WL 4226614 (D.N.D. Oct. 21, 2010); Brown v. Dean, 555 F.
Supp. 502 (D.R.I. 1982). See also Jacksonville Coal. for Voter Prot. v. Hood, 351
F. Supp. 2d 1326 (M.D. Fla. 2004) (unequal access to early voting sites); Brown v.
Post, 279 F. Supp. 60 (W.D. La. 1968) (unequal access to absentee voting
opportunities). “Vote dilution,” in contrast, often results from at-large elections
and similar practices that dilute the value of votes cast by minority voters in places
where they are able to cast a ballot. Farrakhan II, 590 F.3d at 998 n.13; see also
Burton v. City of Belle Glade, 178 F.3d 1175, 1198 (11th Cir. 1999) (explaining
that vote dilution “occurs when an election practice results in the dilution of
minority voting strength and, thus, impairs a minority’s ability to elect the
representative of its choice”).
Section 2(a) explicitly establishes a “results” test, such that a plaintiff need
not prove that a voting practice was adopted or maintained with discriminatory
intent. As originally passed, Section 2 stated:
No voting qualification or prerequisite to voting, or standard, practice
or procedure shall be imposed or applied by any State or political

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-5subdivision to deny or abridge the right of any citizen of the United
States to vote on account of race of color.
Pub. L. No. 89-110, § 2, 79 Stat. 437 (1965). Lower courts had interpreted that
provision to mean that plaintiffs did not have to show discriminatory intent, and
could instead prove a vote dilution claim by establishing that, under the totality of
the circumstances, a voting practice results in discrimination. See, e.g., Zimmer v.
McKeithen, 485 F.2d 1297, 1304-1307 (5th Cir. 1973) (en banc), aff’d, sub nom.
East Carroll Parish Sch. Bd. v. Marshall, 424 U.S. 636 (1976). In City of Mobile
v. Bolden, 446 U.S. 55 (1980), however, a plurality of the Supreme Court held that
Section 2 required a plaintiff bringing a vote dilution challenge to an at-large
election scheme to establish intentional discrimination. Congress responded in
1982 by amending Section 2 to restore the evidentiary standard developed in
earlier vote dilution cases that did not require proof of discriminatory intent, and
that instead focused on the totality of the circumstances operating in the given
jurisdiction. See S. Rep. No. 417, 97th Cong., 2d Sess. 27-28 (1982) (Senate
Report). The Senate Judiciary Committee (Senate Committee) explained that “[a]n
examination of the vote dilution cases before Bolden reveals that Bolden was in
fact a marked departure from prior law” (Senate Report 19), and that amending the
statute to include a “results test” was “meant to restore the pre-[Bolden] legal
standard which governed cases challenging election systems or practices as an
illegal dilution of the minority vote” (Senate Report 27). Thus, by adding the